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CHAPTER 8 
Conflict of Laws 
JEAN E. DE VALPINE 
§8.1. State wrongful death statute: Full faith and credit. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Pearson v. 
Northeast Airlines, Inc.,1 has held that, given nexus with the forum 
of significant elements of the fact matrix, neither the full faith and 
credit clausell nor the due process clauseS of the United States Consti-
tution forbids the forum: (1) to premise a cause of action on the 
wrongful death statute of the foreign lex loci delicti, then (2) to apply 
on public policy rationale its own rules as to quantum and measure 
of damages (3) in disregard of the quantum limitation on damages 
embedded in the foreign statute as an integral qualification on the 
right thereby created, and further (4) in disregard of the express for-
eign statutory theory of damage measure, and finally (5) to revert to 
the lex loci for the rule of measure of interest. 
Pearson, a New Yorker, was killed in August, 1958, at Nantucket, 
Massachusetts, while traveling as a passenger of the defendant airline, 
having purchased his ticket at the defendant's New York office and 
boarded its fatal flight at La Guardia Airport, New York City. The 
defendant airline was a Massachusetts corporation. Pearson's adminis-
tratrix, also of New York, invoking diversity jurisdiction, brought 
action against the defendant in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, seeking damages on -the basis of 
the Massachusetts wrongful death statute.4 
The Massachusetts statute as of the date of the death limited the 
amount recoverable for wrongful death to a "sum of not less than 
$2,000 or more than $15,000 to be assessed with reference to the degree 
of culpability of the defendant. . .. " The plaintiff asked damages 
of $600,000. The jury awarded $134,000, to which the court added 
$26,000 interest,1i applying the New York internal rule that interest 
is part of damages and runs from date of death, as opposed to the 
JEAN E. DE VALPINE is a member of the firm of Powers, Hall, Montgomery &: 
Weston, Boston. 
§8.1. 1309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962). 
2 U.S. Const., Art. IV, §l. 
SId., Amend. XIV. 
4 C.L., c. 229, §2. 
Ii Precisely, $134,043.77 from the jury and $26,160.88 of interest under the New 
York rule. 
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Massachusetts statute providing interest from the date of the writ.s 
As will appear, the district court was first reversed as to both damages 
and interest by a panel of the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit 
and then sustained as to damages, but reversed as to interest by the 
same appellate court on rehearing en banco 
The opinion of the district court does not confront or even imply 
any constitutional issue.7 The district court approached the case as 
a simple matter of applying Erie R. Co. V. TompkinsS as developed 
by Guaranty Trust Co. of New York V. York9 and Klaxon CO. V. Sten-
tor Electric Mfg. CO.,10 to the effect that in such a diversity case, the 
federal district court "sits as another state court of New York and must 
apply New York's conflicts law as announced by its highest court." 11 
Just previously in Kilberg V. Northeast Airlines,12 the New York Court 
of Appeals had announced the pertinent New York conflicts rule in 
brief dictum. Accordingly, the federal district judge summarized and 
rested his decision on Kilberg as follows: 
In Kilberg V. Northeast Airlines, a case arising out of the same 
crash involved here, the New York Court of Appeals in a con-
sidered dictum expressed by the Chief Judge and concurred in by 
three Associate Judges said: "For our courts to be limited by 
[Massachusetts'] damage ceiling (at least as to our own domicili-
aries) is so completely contrary to our public policy that we 
should refuse to [enforce it]." It was further said that if Kilberg's 
claim which, like this, was filed under the Massachusetts statute, 
were amended to seek more than $15,000, it could "be enforced, 
if the proof so justifies, without regard to the $15,000 limit." 
That dictum, so far as appears, has not been repudiated or modi-
fied. I believe, therefore, that it states the law which, if this suit 
were pending in a New York court, that court would apply. Ac-
cordingly, since I believe I am required to apply it here, I hold 
that the amount recoverable by this plaintiff is not limited to 
$15,000.13 
The district court then extended Kilberg beyond the express but 
within the implied scope of the Kilberg dictum, holding that the 
New York theory of measure of damages, namely the degree of the 
plaintiff's pecuniary injury, was applicable, rather than the Massachu-
setts statutory theory, namely the degree of the defendant's culpabil-
ity.u The trial judge later added interest computed pursuant to New 
S G.L., c. 229, §11. 
7199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
8304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). 
9326 U.S. 99, 65 Sup. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079 (1945). 
10313 U.S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1147 (1941). 
11199 F. Supp. 539, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
129 N.Y.2d 34, 39,172 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1961). 
18199 F. Supp. 539, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
uIbid. 
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York law, and denied the defendant's motion to strike such interest. 
The appeal to the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit was first 
heard by a three-judge panel of that court. By a two-ta-one decision, 
the panel reversed the district court, holding that the refusal of the 
trial court to apply the $15,000 limitation of the Massachusetts statute 
violated the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.t5 The panel unanimously reversed the trial judge on his appli-
cation of New York interest, holding that the Massachusetts rule 
should control.18 
The plaintiff then petitioned for rehearing of the appeal en bane. 
Rehearing was granted and the Court of Appeals of the Second Cir-
cuit sitting en bane, by a six-to-three decision, reversed its three-judge 
panel, sustaining the holding of the trial court that the Massachusetts 
$15,000 limit did not bind a federal court sitting as a New York court 
and that the proper theory of damages was the New York measure 
of the plaintiff's pecuniary injury and not the Massachusetts statutory 
measure of the defendant's culpability.17 On the interest issue the 
court en bane agreed with the panel that the Massachusetts rule should 
prevail. 
It is understood at this writing that preparation by the defendant 
of petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is in 
process. 
In assessing Pearson, it is essential to bear in mind three important 
areas in which the majority and minority of the Court of Appeals are 
explicitly or implicitly in agreement. First, both sides basically con-
cur that attempts to label the matter as "substantive" or "procedural" 
are of no use, and in fact that the damage limitation is in some real 
sense clearly "substantive" and "built into" the statute as an integral 
part of the defined liability. 
Second, on the minority side, it is conceded to the majority that 
New York had sufficient nexus with the underlying event to permit, 
free of constitutional bar, forthright application of internal New York 
law without reference to Massachusetts. This the minority concedes 
but contends simply that New York, having chosen to apply its own 
conflict rule referring over to the lex loci to find the existence of lia-
bility and having there found a statutory liability and explicitly pre-
mised the existence of New York liability solely upon the ground of 
the Massachusetts liability, is required to recognize the whole sub-
stance of the Massachusetts definition of the liability including the 
damage ceiling. The significant New York contact with the elemental 
facts is also essential to understanding what the majority does not hold. 
For one thing, it does not hold that the full faith and credit clause 
leaves the forum free to choose its own law, the lex loci, or any permu-
111 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962). 
18Id. at 136, citing Webb v. Davenport, 15 App. Div. 2d 42, 222 N.Y.S.2d 566 
(1st Dept. 1961) (decided after denial of the motion to strike), afJ'd, 11 N.Y.2d 312, 
183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962). 
17309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962). 
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tation of the two, in the absence of significant contact with the forum. 
Third, the minority does not dispute the rejection by the majority 
of the passe "vested rights" doctrine of territorial sovereignty nor the 
corollary majority assertion of the modern view· that the forum can 
apply no other law but its own including its own conflict rules and 
that application of such conflict rules results in "absorption" of the 
foreign substantive law into the corpus of domestic law. But the key 
point is that in making and having made such absorption, the forum 
applies its own law and does not give recognition to "vested rights" 
created under a foreign law. The majority accuses the minority of 
atavistic "vested rights" conceptualism in conceding on the one hand 
that New York need not apply any of the Massachusetts statute while 
insisting on the other hand that if New York chooses to adopt by refer-
ence some part of the Massachusetts statute, then it cannot stop but 
must go all the way or at least to the point of applying the whole of 
the substantive content of the Massachusetts statute. 
Perhaps at the root of the conceptual difficulty is the fact that the 
full faith and credit clause is "vested rights" in tenor and intent, reflect-
ing dominant eighteenth-century legal philosophy. 
The majority and dissenting opinions of the three-judge panel, to-
gether with the majority and dissenting opinions of the court en bane, 
ultimately reduce to a differential in the relative order of values which 
the majority and minority factions of the Court of Appeals would, 
respectively, assign (1) to the freedom of the forum state within the 
bounds of federalism and the ambit of its proper governmental con-
cern to accord its public policy paramountcy over its own ordinary 
conflict rule when such conflict rule would otherwise entail enforce-
ment of the conflicting policy with respect to measure and quantum 
of tort liability embodied in the relevant statute of the foreign locus 
delicti, as balanced against (2) the policy thrust of the federal full faith 
and credit clause toward regularization and uniformity of legal status 
and consequence on the principle of "maximum enforcement in each 
state of the obligations created or recognized by the statutes of sister 
states." 18 
The majority seems to think that the reach of the public policy of 
the forum ought not to be circumscribed short of the quantum and 
measure of damages elements of the Pearson situation. The majority 
is fearful that evolution of the full faith and credit clause to bar the 
reach of New York public policy short of these elements would freeze 
into the Federal Constitution conflict of laws doctrines in themselves 
notably underdeveloped and transitional. 
On the other hand, the final position of the minority as reflected 
in its en banc dissent would seem to stem from an intuition that the 
majority result seriously vitiates the policy of the full faith and credit 
clause. In the view of the minority, the majority countenances the 
development by the forum of a doctrine of eclecticism in the guise of 
18 See Hughes v. Fetter. 1141 U.S. 609. 611, 612. 71 Sup. Ct. 980. 981-982, 95 L. Ed. 
1212, 1216 (1951). 
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so-called "conflict rules" permitting the forum explicitly to premise 
liability by selective reference to statutory law of the locus' delicti. 
while at the same time. through invocation of public policy, excising 
such foreign prescribed elements as inherent damage limitation and 
theory of measure of damages and substituting the wholly different 
damage quantum and measure rules of the forum.19 To the minority 
the result fabricated by the forum ought not be masked under "con-
flict doctrine." The law still needs due respect for category and 
concept. 
§8_2. Annulment of marriage: Full faith and credit. In Robbins 
v. Robbins,1 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court gave full faith 
and credit2 to the decree of a Missouri court of competent jurisdiction 
annulling a Massachusetts marriage, even though Missouri erred by 
failing to apply its own choice of law rule requiring reference to the 
place of marriage, Massachusetts, for the controlling substantive law of 
annulment.s 
Ronni Robbins and Saul Robbins were married in Massachusetts 
in 1953. Their Massachusetts divorce became absolute in 1958. Saul 
was ordered to pay weekly alimony. Thereafter, in 1959, Ronni mar-
ried Goodman in Massachusetts. Goodman was a resident of Mis-
souri. He and Ronni went to Missouri where they lived together for 
only two days. In 1960 Ronni obtained in a Missouri court a decree 
annulling her marriage to Goodman. The Missouri court seems to 
have applied the Missouri substantive law of annulment, which ap-
parently differed crucially from that of Massachusetts. 
After the Missouri annulment decree, Saul petitioned the Massa-
chusetts Probate Court for a modification of the 1958 alimony decree 
under G.L., c. 208, §37, which authorizes the court to modify an ali-
mony decree. A "substantial change in circumstances" is requisite 
to such a modification, and subsequent marriage is such a substantial 
change.4 Saul asserted that the Goodman marriage constituted the 
requisite subsequent marriage, and hence a substantial change in cir-
cumstances entitling him to modification of his alimony obligation. 
The Probate Court decreed suspension of Saul's alimony obligation. 
On appeal, with report of the evidence and findings of material fact, 
the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Probate Court as "plainly 
wrong," and restored Saul's alimony burden. 
The appellate Court reached this result in two steps, first by sus-
taining the Missouri annulment, and second by finding on the evi-
dence that the annulled marriage did not amount to a significant 
19 Not to mention the spectacle of reversion to the lex loci for the interest com-
putation rule. 
§8.2. 1343 Mass. 247, 178 N.E.2d 281 (1961). 
2 U.S. Const., Art. IV, §1. 
8 Both Missouri and Massachusetts concur in this rule obviating the renvoi prob-
lem. See Hartman v. Valier & Spies Milling Co., 356 Mo. 424, 433, 202 S.W.2d 1, 6 
(1947); Levy v. Levy, 309 Mass. 230, 233, 34 N.E.2d 650, 652 (1941). 
4343 Mass. 247, 249, 178 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1961), citing Southworth v. Treadwell, 
168 Mass. 511, 512, 47 N.E. 93, 94 (1897). 
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change of circumstances. The jurisdiction of the Missouri court was 
not in question on appeal, being a finding of the trial court accepted 
as such by the appellate Court.1I 
The primary authority for according full faith and credit to the 
Missouri annulment decree is Sutton v. Leib,6 in which the United 
States Supreme Court held that the federal full faith and credit clause 
compelled Illinois to recognize a New York decree annulling a Nevada 
marriage, the New York decree being based upon competent jurisdic-
tion. Sutton v. Leib, however, did not present any issue as to mistake 
of law or fact, procedural error, deficiency or inadequacy of any 
kind whatever in the New York annulment decree which Illinois was 
compelled to credit. The Supreme Judicial Court in Robbins conse-
quently went, pro arguendo, one step beyond Sutton v. Leib. It de-
cided the depth of the recognition which must be given the jurisdic-
tionally sound annulment decree of a sister state, granted that the 
sister state made a mistake of law consisting of erroneous application 
of its own conflict rule. The Court held as follows: 
It is settled law that a foreign judgment cannot be denied recogni-
tion solely because of error of law or fact which does not affect 
the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment. Fauntleroy 
v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230; American Exp. Co. v. Mullins, 212 U.S. 311; 
Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449; Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282. 
Restatement: Conflict of Laws, §431. The "full faith and credit 
clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits 
of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or 
the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment is 
based." Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462. In the light of 
these principles we must deal with the case on the footing that 
there has been a valid annulment of the respondent'S marriage to 
Goodman.7 
This result represents an almost inescapable implication of the full 
faith and credit clause, taken together with the authorities cited by 
the Court, and surely accords with the full faith and credit intent to 
promote interstate uniformity and stability in the legal status of per-
sons. However, the point of novelty is that in each of Fauntleroy,8 
American Express CO.,9 Roche,10 Titusll and Milliken,12 the prece-
dents cited by the Court, the party opposing recognition of the foreign 
judgment was a party to that judgment having had his day in court 
in the foreign forum. Here, the husband, Saul, the objector to the 
11343 Mass. 247. 250.178 N.E.2d 281. 283 (1961). 
6342 U.S. 402. 72 Sup. Ct. 398. 96 L. Ed. 448 (1952). 
7343 Mass. 247. 250.178 N.E.2d 281. 283 (1961). 
8 Fauntleroy v. Lum. 210 U.S. 230. 28 Sup. Ct. 641. 52 L. Ed. 1039 (1908). 
9 American Express Co. v. Mullins. 212 U.s. 311, 29 Sup. Ct. 381. 53 L. Ed. 525 
(1909). . 
10 Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449. 48 Sup. Ct. 142. 72 L. Ed. 365 (1928). 
11 Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 59 Sup. Ct. 557, 83 L. Ed. 653 (1939). 
12 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 Sup. Ct. 539, 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940). 
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Missouri judgment, was not a party to that judgment and presumably 
would have had no standing whatever before the Missouri court in 
the annulment proceeding. The Supreme Judicial Court has at least 
in part responded to the question left open in Sutton v. Leib as to 
whether full faith and credit unassailability of an annulment decree 
of a court of competent jurisdiction is limited to the parties, or ex-
tends to strangers on parity with a divorce decree under the doctrine 
of Johnson v. Muelberger. l8 
§8.3. Property in motor vehicle: Power to alter property rightlt. 
In Commercial Credit Corp. v. Stan Cross Buick, Inc.,l the Massachu-
setts forum stated by dictum that the law of Maine controlled the 
property rights in a motor vehicle, including not only the power of 
a bailee to transmit title, but also the application of principles of 
apparent authority and estoppel, when up to and including the act 
of bailment, the vehicle and all property transactions therein had 
locus in Maine.2 The Massachusetts action arose out of the attempted 
sale of the vehicle in Massachusetts by the Maine bailee who brought 
it into Massachusetts for purposes of disposition. Although this deci-
sion represents predictable application of well-developed choice of law 
doctrine, it is reviewed herein in greater depth than academically war-
ranted, simply because it entails an omnipresent concern of the auto-
mobile age. 
Lloyd, an automobile dealer in Maine, sold a car to Power under 
a conditional sales contract which Lloyd assigned to the plaintiff, Com-
mercial. Power defaulted. Commercial repossessed the vehicle and 
received Power's permission to sell the car at a private sale rather than 
by public auction as provided in the conditional sales contract. The 
agreement between Lloyd and its assignee, Commercial, contained a 
"Reserve Agreement" that if Commercial repossessed a vehicle under 
an instrument assigned to it by Lloyd, Lloyd would repurchase the 
vehicle for cash, and that pending such repurchase, Commercial could 
store the vehicle on Lloyd's premises without charge. Pursuant to 
this agreement, the vehicle was turned over to Lloyd. Lloyd took the 
car from Maine to Concord Auto Auction, Inc., in Acton, Massachu-
setts. Lloyd paid Concord to "cry" the vehicle, and defendant, Stan 
Cross Buick, there purchased the vehicle, paying the purchase price 
to Lloyd. Stan Cross resold the car the next day. Lloyd made one 
part payment on account of the vehicle to Commercial after the 
Massachusetts events. 
All prior agreements and acts involving the vehicle took place in 
13340 U.S. 581, 71 Sup. Ct. 474, 95 L. Ed. 552 (1951), holding against attack in 
New York surrogate proceedings by a child and legatee of a decedent divorced in 
Florida, that "[w]hen a divorce cannot be attacked for lack of jurisdiction by par-
ties actually before the court or strangers in the- rendering state, it cannot be at-
tacked by them anywhere in the Union." 
§8.3. 1343 Mass. 622, 180 N.E.2d 88 (1962). 
2 Restatement of Conflict of Laws §§49, 102, 343; d. Beale, Jurisdiction over Title 
of Absent Owner in a Chattel, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 805 (1927); Restatement of Conflict 
of Laws, Second, Tent. Draft No.4, §I02, and Tent. Draft No.5, §254a, pp. 78-81. 
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Maine while the vehicle was located there. Commercial had no 
knowledge of and gave no consent to its removal to Massachusetts. 
The parties agreed that Commercial owned the vehicle after the re-
possession. 
In tort for conversion brought in Massachusetts by Commercial 
against Concord Auto Auction, Inc., and Stan Cross Buick, concededly 
a bona fide purchaser, the Supreme Judicial Court on bill of excep-
tions held that the latter was liable for conversion, but that the former, 
merely a commission solicitor of offers to buy the car, did not exert 
sufficient dominion and control over the vehicle to constitute it a 
converter. 
The determinations of actual and apparent authority of Lloyd were 
said to be subject to Maine law. Likewise, the question of any es-
toppel against Commercial and all "property rights" underlying the 
action of conversion were determined under Maine law.3 But, in the 
absence of assertion that Maine law was different from that of Massa-
chusetts, the Court assumed identity between the two.4 
A brief summary of several of the supporting cases cited by the 
Court is helpful. 
In Langworthy v. Little,'" a personal property mortgage valid in 
New York, where executed, gave the mortgagee title sufficient to main-
tain trover against a Massachusetts deputy sheriff attaching the prop-
erty in Massachusetts, where the mortgagor took it. New York law 
controlled the title issue, despite failure to comply with the Massachu-
setts requirement that the mortgage be recorded in the town where 
the mortgagee principally transacted his business. 
In Edgerly v. Bush,6 the plaintiff took a chattel mortgage in New 
York on a span of horses. The mortgagor took the horses to Canada, 
where they were sold through a horse trader to one Bremley, a New 
York resident who purchased in good faith in ignorance of the plain-
tiff's claim. Bremley sold the horses to the defendant in Canada. Al-
though the defendant, successor to Bremley's title, would have pre-
vailed if Canadian law were applied, the New York court held that 
New York law governed when the plaintiff mortgagee and the mort-
gagor from whom the plaintiff got title were citizens of New York at the 
time of the mortgage, also a New York based transaction. Under New 
York law, the plaintiff prevailed, the New York rule being that the 
mortgagee prevails over a later bona fide purchaser from one who has 
acquired the property by conversion. 
Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc.,7 offers an interesting comparison. 
The plaintiff bought a diamond ring at public auction in New Jersey. 
Her auctioneer seller had no actual authority to sell to her, being 
merely entrusted with the ring to exhibit it with knowledge and 
3848 Mass. 622, 625, 180 N.E.2d 88. 90 (1962). 
4 G.L.. c. 288. §70. 
Ii 12 Cush. 109. III (Mass. 1858). 
681 N.Y. 199.208·205 (1880). 
7805 N.Y. 180. 188·184, III N.E.2d 871, 874-875 (1958). 
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acquiescence of the defendant owner, a New York merchant. The 
auctioneer had selected the article from the New York merchant in 
New York and transported it to New Jersey. On application of New 
Jersey law as controlling, the auctioneer was held clothed with such 
indicia of title as to preclude the defendant from denying his apparent 
authority. The case is distinguishable from the principle case on the 
ground that the diamond ring was taken to New Jersey with the con-
sent of the defendant New York merchant. 
§8.4. Negligent operation of motor vehicle: Statutory standard of 
duty. Goodale v. Morrison l applies the general conflict rule that the 
lex loci delicti generates the substance of the related matrix of legal 
rights, duties and liabilities. Of more interest and depth, the case 
illustrates the conflict doctrine that the rules governing the trier of 
fact as to passage by inference from evidence of subsidiary facts to 
ultimate findings of jurally pregnant facts such as "negligence" are 
founded in the law of the locus.2 Thus, if the lex loci treats certain 
classes of statutes prescribing rules of conduct as setting norms of due 
care, while the lex fori treats such rules as merely defining a kind of 
sufficient but not conclusive subsidiary evidence, the trier of fact in 
the forum will be forced to pass from a finding of violation of the 
norm to a finding of negligence. In short, conclusive evidence in the 
lex loci remains conclusive in the forum. 
The plaintiffs were passengers in a car owned and operated by the 
defendant's intestate. It is implied but not stated that the plaintiffs 
and the defendant's intestate were Massachusetts domiciliaries. The 
car, traveling a New Hampshire highway, crossed over the center line 
and hit head-on a car coming from the opposite direction. The plain-
tiffs were injured and the defendant's intestate received injuries from 
which she died thirteen days later. The jury returned a verdict for 
the defendant. 
The trial judge took judicial notice of the law of New Hampshire.S 
In New Hampshire, a gratuitous guest passenger may recover against 
an operator for injuries caused by ordinary negligence. A New Hamp-
shire statute forbids driving across an unbroken line in a New Hamp-
shire highway "except (1) in an emergency, (2) to permit ingress or 
egress to side roads or property adjacent to the highway, or (3) in case 
such operator has an unobstructed view and can see the end of the 
said unbroken painted line." The judge, consonant with the general 
Massachusetts rule, instructed the jury in part: "The fact that the 
statute was violated is evidence of negligence on the part of the person 
who violated it. It is not conclusive evidence, because inquiry must 
be made and should be made as to all the attending circumstances." 
The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the plaintiffs' exceptions to 
§8.4. 1 343 Mass. 607, 180 N.E.2d 67 (1962). 
:I For further comment on this problem, see 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §8.2. 
noting Weir v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 340 Mass. 66, 162 N.E.2d 
793 (1959). See Peterson v. Boston & Maine R.R., 310 Mass. 45, 47-48, 36 N.E.2d 
701, 704 (1941). 
S G.L., c. 233, §70. 
9
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the charge and ordered a new trial on the ground that under the law 
of New Hampshire the statute prescribes a duty, violation of which is 
"in itself a breach of duty upon which a cause of action may be rested 
if it causes injury." A challenging exercise in analysis would be com-
parison and rationalization of the conflict rule of Goodale with the 
rule of Levy v. Steiger4 that Massachusetts will apply its own burden 
of proof of contributory negligence.1> 
421111 Mass. 600,124 N.E. 477 (1919). 
I> See Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), calling this burden of 
proof "substance" but binding the federal court on diversity to the state court 
classification as "procedure." 
10
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